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Arguably, the most important outcome of the December 2011 parliamentary elections in Russia were 
the peaceful protests that followed them. Even if the protests did not offer much in view of an 
alternative to the current regime,1 or even critique of the current regime, they have become, in effect, 
protests against Vladimir Putin’s sistema.  
 
What is sistema? The term is elusive. Sistema is an open secret that represents shared, yet not 
articulated, perceptions of power and the system of government in Russia. I introduce the term 
‘Putin’s sistema’ to designate the governance model shaped during Putin’s presidency (2000–2008), 
inclusive of its grey areas. It stands for the workings of power networks and methods of informal 
governance applied by political elites, intertwined with the existing formal institutional structures. 
For example, if Putin’s governance model is defined in terms of a vertikal of power—Russia’s 
hierarchical system of government—Putin’s sistema also embraces those informal networks that 
undermine the vertikal and manipulate official policies enhancing it. In a way, sistema refers to the 
outcome of the existing clash between official policies and unofficial influences, between formal 
hierarchies and informal networks.2  
 
Given the importance of informality in Russian politics, research in this field is fairly scarce. Some 
of the reasons are of a pragmatic nature. In studying informal institutions, networks and practices, 
researchers often encounter methodological challenges, pressures to work across different 
disciplines, as well as unwelcoming attitudes of respondents. But there are also conceptual puzzles 
of integrating the informal dimension into disciplinary research, as well as moral resistance to find 
out inconvenient facts about grey areas of politics, the economy and society.  
 
All books discussed in this review article represent an important development: a shift from the 
predominant ‘transition paradigm’ view on Russia. They offer concepts and methodologies that 
delve into what Thomas Carothers calls ‘grey zones’. According to Carothers, of the 100 countries 
                                                 
1 The critique of the regime was personalized. The journalist Artemii Troitskii called for Putin to disclose how much 
money he had and to show his wife. The blogger Alexei Naval’nyi referred to the leadership as ‘botox boys’. Those who 
spoke about the future did not suggest any particular projects, but called for an honest Russia (Boris Akunin), and 
increasing influence by the people on politics (Ksenia Sobchak). 
2 Ledeneva, A. Can Russia Modernise: Putin’s Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance. Cambridge 
University Press (in press)  
that could be identified as transitional, less than 20 are clearly on the path to becoming successful 
well-functioning democracies. The majority of third-wave countries do not appear to be 
consolidating their early democratic promise. While some have regressed into explicit 
authoritarianism, most transitional countries are ‘neither dictatorial, nor clearly headed for 
democracy’.3 The sheer number of prefixes and qualifiers that have been coined to describe the 
‘democracies’ in this grey zone is telling: semi, formal, electoral, façade, pseudo, weak, partial, 
illiberal and virtual, to name but a few, with specific additions of guided, managed and sovereign 
democracy to describe Putin’s regime in Russia. David Collier and Steven Levitsky coined the term 
‘democracies with adjectives’ in order to emphasize the conceptual stretch implied in referring to the 
countries of the grey zone as democracies.4 In Carothers’s paradox, by describing the countries in 
the grey zone as democracies, authors apply the transition paradigm to the countries the very 
existence of which calls this paradigm into question.  
 
Carothers’s call for conceptual innovation to describe the political ‘grey zones’ is answered in a 
number of ways.5 I introduce the term sistema to refer to Putin’s non-transparent system of 
governance. Gulnaz Sharafutdinova and David Lane escape the trap of ‘democracies with adjectives’ 
by searching for adjectives for Russian capitalism. Contributions by Gilles Favarel-Garrigues, as 
well as Lilia Shevtsova and Andrew Wood’s Change or decay (reviewed on pp. XX–XX), add 
further dimensions to the understanding of how Putin’s sistema works: its communist economic 
background and its external pressures.  
 
In his Elites and classes in the transformation of state socialism, Lane argues that from what was 
initially a form of ‘chaotic’ or ‘disorganised’ capitalism, Russia has developed a ‘state-led 
corporatist’ type of capitalism. Lane views the Putin-imposed form of ‘elite settlement’ (sometimes 
referred to in the media as ‘Russia, Inc’ or ‘Putin’s friends’)6 as a certain enactment of the ‘transition 
paradigm’, and shows the weakness of the elites-based types of approaches to societal change. He 
laments the decline of a once commonly held view that most Third-World countries were not ready 
for democracy to a clear and transition paradigm-driven break from that way of thinking. The idea 
that there was a range of preconditions for democracy relating to issues of wealth, class, institutional 
legacy and political culture—some would even request American-type middle classes and a heritage 
of protestant individualism—lost ground to the belief that ‘all that seems to be necessary for 
democratization [is] a decision by a country‘s political elites to move towards democracy’. Thus, the 
role of elites becomes central, given the lack of need for preconditions of transition. Democratic 
transition should include a transplanted institutional design, with the determinative importance of 
elections.  
 
Accordingly, ‘elite studies’ have taken centre stage and resulted in a variety of quantitative and 
qualitative analyses of discourse;7 formation of clans;8 anti-modern networks;9 network society;10 
network state;11 and of the association of state networks with the middle classes.12  
                                                 
3 Carothers, ‘The end of the transition paradigm’, Journal of Democracy 13: 1, 2002, p. 9. 
4 Collier and Levitsky, ‘Democracy with adjectives: conceptual innovation in comparative research’, World Politics 49: 
3, April 1997, pp. 430–51. 
5 Carothers, ‘The end of the transition paradigm’, pp. 5–21.  
6 Korporatsiia Rossia, as in the separate references fileThe New Times,  
7 Dubin et al 2007, 2008; Anton Oleinik, ‘Models of power relationships in post-Soviet societies’, Journal of Communist 
Studies and Transition Politics, 24: 1, March 2008; Drobizheva 1996 – all in the separate file 
8 Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003; Wedel 2003; Kosals 2007; Mukhin 2005; Mitrokhin 2008 – in file 
 In his thorough empirical study, Lane re-integrates the notions of class and interest into the analysis 
of the elites and illustrates their explanatory power in accounting for elites’ social and economic 
values and global outlooks. Lane compares political elites under Gorbachev and Yeltsin in terms of 
their age, educational background and, most interestingly, their influence on decision-making. By 
assessing the influence of the executive (government) elite, the rule-making elite, and the leaders of 
parties and factions in parliament (in post in 1992–93), he identifies an important change. Yeltsin’s 
elite groups differed in their views about ‘who makes the decision’ in the light of their own interests, 
and also in the light of declaring their views about interests. The executive legitimacy was 
undermined by dependence on foreigners; at least the parliamentary and party elites believed this to 
be the case. Examination of Gorbachev elite’s responses did not show such divisions. Yeltsin’s 
leadership was widely believed to promote the interests of specific elite groups, their own interests 
and the ‘interests of society’ (p. 136 probably remove page numbers throughout?). 
 
In her Political consequences of crony capitalism, Sharafutdinova identifies a similar pattern at the 
regional level, whereby interests of cronies undermine the leadership’s policies, whether in 
progressive Nizhny Novgorod or more traditional Tatarstan. She reinvents the notion of cronyism 
and views it as a definitive in the nature of Russian capitalism. Sharafutdinova admits the long roots 
of the phenomenon, and associates it with a customary use of power by public officials to benefit 
and enrich their friends and supporters outside the government. Yet she also identifies a change—the 
degree to which a close connection between state officials and economic elites dominates policy-
making. She distinguishes between traditional cronyism and ‘crony capitalism’ by defining the latter 
as a distinct institutional order characterized by the domination of informal elite groups. ‘In such a 
system selected economic elites receive preferential treatment and privileges, making support from 
the state rather than market forces a crucial factor for maintaining and accruing wealth’ (p. 3X).  
 
Sharafutdinova considers the puzzle of co-existence of crony capitalism with such democratic 
institutions as political competition and the electoral process. In tune with Carothers’s analysis, she 
points out that after almost two decades of transition, only the new post-communist members of the 
European Union can claim that democracy and markets are gradually taking shape (p. 2X). This is 
despite the fact that most countries in the region have instituted elections as the main mechanism for 
power transfer and allowed for the flourishing of private property and wealth accumulation. Formal 
democratic institutions appear to be a façade, aimed at legitimizing mostly unaccountable elites, 
corrupt political-economic systems and markets that are not free.  
 
Sharafutdinova establishes distinct patterns of political evolution in the Russian regions of Tatarstan 
and Nizhny Novgorod, where democratic institutions became enveloped by manipulative practices 
surrounding elections, extensive application of political technologies, and the use of dirty tricks 
known as ‘black piar’. As a result, she argues, the very idea of democracy has received a bad name 
in Russia—‘the baby gets thrown out with the bathwater’ (p. 3). In a way, Sharafutdinova’s puzzle 
of what is happening to democratic institutions under crony capitalism is complementary to Andrew 
Wilson’s analysis of the power of political technologies and the theatrical facades of virtual politics, 
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encapsulated in his concept of dramaturgiia of the elections13 and to this reviewer’s ethnography of 
white, grey and black piar practices, depicting on the spectrum of practices reflecting legal and 
ethical constraints on use of compromising information (kompromat).14 Whereby black (illegal and 
unethical) and white (legal and ethical) forms of informational warfare are more or less clear-cut, the 
grey areas (illegal but ethical, legal but unethical forms of campaigning) are hard to grasp. The latter 
are particularly interesting, and Sharafutdinova highlights the emerging shifts in legal and ethical 
frameworks characteristic of the post-communist transition. 
 
Sharafutdinova’s study of the interaction between political competition and crony capitalism 
concludes that under crony capitalism, political competition can undermine the legitimacy of state 
authorities and such democratic institutions as the electoral mechanism. Played out in public during 
electoral campaigns, unrestricted political competition uncovers the predatory nature of crony elites 
engaged in the struggle for power and wealth. Consequently, the electoral process itself gets 
discredited as an essential part of the overall institutional order in the process. Non-competitive 
political systems avoid such negative tendencies, at least in the short run.  
 
If we turn to Putin’s sistema, Sharafutdinova’s analysis points to its reliance on cronyism, while 
Favarel-Garrigues’s emphasis is on its use of suspended punishment. In his detailed archival study of 
Policing economic crime in Russia, Favarel-Garrigues establishes the legal vulnerability and social 
illegitimacy of entrepreneurs as exploited by the political regimes from the beginning of the 
Brezhnev era in 1965 to the mid-1990s. The two points are not unrelated: where access to wealth and 
business opportunities is achieved through cronies and informal channels, the property rights cannot 
be fully legitimate and secure. The vulnerability of economic actors should be preserved in order to 
enhance political stability and corporate control. The vulnerability of the elites is but one illustration 
of sistema’s fundamental ambivalence. There are others. ‘Crony capitalism’ has similarly ambiguous 
implications for economic growth. It appears to undermine market competition, legitimacy of the 
market institutions and the framework for entrepreneurship. However, it also enables, enhances and 
stabilizes business undertaken by crony capitalists. 
 
Outside the post-communist region, the term ‘crony capitalism’ has acquired considerable popularity 
since it was used as an explanation for the East Asian crisis.15 However, the concept of crony 
capitalism has been criticized as a description of a distinct kind of capitalism associated with the 
state playing a key role in the allocation process. Surajit Mazumdar points out its inability to provide 
a suitable framework for understanding the business-state interaction.16 He suggests that the 
phenomenon of cronyism is also widespread in all modern societies and is not necessarily a feature 
of capitalism characterized by any particular economic policy. In fact, crony capitalism may lie at 
the very heart of the contemporary global capitalist order, and this may explain why the concept of 
crony capitalism has acquired such prominence.17 
 
                                                 
13 Wilson, Virtual politics: faking democracy in the post-Soviet world, Yale University Press, 2005.  
14 Ledeneva, 2006. How Russia Really Works. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
15 See for example, David C. Kang, Crony capitalism: corruption and development in South Korea and the Philippines, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002 - yes 
16 Surajitremove name? Mazumdar, ‘Crony capitalism: caricature or category?’, February 2008, unpublished, accessed at 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19626/ on 20 December 2011. 
17 Mazumdar, ‘Crony capitalism: caricature or category?’.  
Although the argument of the universality of cronyism makes sense—after all, it is grounded in the 
universality of social networks and their functionality in all societies—there are at least three 
characteristics that make Putin’s sistema specific.  
 
The first characteristic is the degree to which crony networks are used for the purposes of Putin’s 
micro-management or ‘manual control’. Besides, Sharafutdinova’s evidence suggests that cronyism 
in Russian regions is systemic and is not counterbalanced by political competition, business 
rationality, civic freedoms and media-driven accountability. The relative weakness of checks and 
balances on the elites’ cronyism means that related practices are widely spread and accepted at every 
level of society. They may not be fully legitimate but they are widespread. It also means that the 
ruling elite can remain a fairly closed and stable group of people. Putin’s sistema has also been said 
to reproduce the tradition of stability of cadres associated with Brezhnev’s period of late socialism. 
In her empirical study of Soviet and post-Soviet political elites, Olga Kryshtanovskaya argues that 
Gorbachev destabilized the Soviet sistema.18 Yeltsin proceeded in that direction—his appointments 
and sackings are remembered as nightmarish by officials. Putin’s ‘vertical of power’ has become 
known for the stability of his networks. Most analysts and observers agree that Putin ‘does not 
betray his own people’ (svoi).19 There are exceptions when informal agreements are broken and 
people are willing to go against the sistema, but these are few.  
 
Putin’s sistema functions with some elements of the ‘administrative-command’ system of late 
socialism. Administrative-command methods remain effective to mobilize cadres and to allocate 
resources, somewhat adjusted to the present-day objectives and priorities. But there are also 
significant differences: the party line has given place to private interests, state property to privatized 
assets, informal exchange of favours to monetized kickbacks, planning to the constraints of global 
finance, and overtly command methods to more subtle informal signals.20 
 
The second characteristic of Putin’s sistema is its orientation on wealth, even where communist 
legacies continue to surface in the defects of privatization, the weakness of property rights, and the 
inefficiency of law enforcement. Favarel-Garrigues argues for the reinvention of entrepreneurial 
practices with reference to a panorama of illicit practices and realities of ‘underground economy’ in 
the Soviet Union of the 1970s and 1980s, and the redefining of the penal policy in late 1980s to 
1990s, both contributing to the subsequent development of markets and private entrepreneurship. His 
analysis of false reporting (pripiski), bribery (vzyatochnichestvo), corruption (korruptsiya), progress 
                                                 
18 Kryshtanovskaya, 2005 Anatomiia Rossiiskoi Elity. Moscow: Zakharov, and Kryshtanovskaya, O 
and White, S November 2005. ‘Inside the Putin Court: A Research Note’, Europe-Asia 
Studies 57(7): 1065-107 
19 For ‘svoi’ types, including inner circle, core contacts, useful friends and mediated contacts, see Ledeneva, as in Fn2 
Can Russia modernise: Putin’s sistema, power networks and informal governance, Cambridge University Press, in press.  
20 With regard to law enforcement institutions, see Vladimir Pastukhov, ‘Opaque institutions (mutnyeinstituty)’, in 
Pastukhov, 2010, ‘Мутныеинституты: «РеформаМВД» икризис «регулярногогосударства» в России’, based on a 
lecture given at St Antony’s College, Oxford, on 3 February 2010. 
pushers (tolkachi), moonlighters (shabashniki), illegal producers (tsekhoviki) and hooligans 
(khuligany)—is an important insight into the study of informal practices from the perspective of 
policing. An understandable omission in the book is the use of blat networks in policing context—
very little record of it can be found in archives—that would make an interesting addition to Favarel-
Garrigues’s near comprehensive list of informal practices in the period of transition. Essential for 
our understanding of the workings of Putin’s sistema today are his findings of ambiguity around 
such entrepreneurial practices and a shifting boundary between legal and illegal economic activity.  
 
Favarel-Garrigues’s analysis of the challenges of policing in the early years of Russia’s economic 
transition, when the Soviet legal matrix for business activity failed to keep up with new post-Soviet 
business practices, illustrates his general point about the squeeze on policemen, applicable in today’s 
Russia. Just as any street-level bureaucrat, he documents, the Soviet policeman was an agent whose 
activity was defined by ‘constant management of dilemmas arising from the desire to comply with 
the orders from above and at the same time to satisfy the demands of the citizenry’. The 
effectiveness of the network-based governance depends on the degree of vulnerability of those 
involved. In this sense, corrupt practices, for example, are subversive of sistema, but they also help 
to hold sistema together. Corrupt officials and businessmen are compromised, can be exposed 
personally and thus cannot enjoy secure property rights. They are therefore bound into sistema and 
can be mobilized for its purposes. Being compromised is essential for becoming a sistema insider. It 
allows the leadership to dominate, to keep insiders in line and also to achieve its key objectives, 
namely political stability and wealth creation. The incorporation of such practices into policing—
stemming from the police nature of the Soviet state and the specifics of tools used by the police—
accounts for the emerging power of siloviki and their present-day involvement in the so-called raider 
attacks undertaken under the patronage of state officials, as well as other forms of economic crime. 
 
The vulnerability of individuals and the fluidity of rules are at the centre of Shevtsova’s definition of 
sistema. It is ‘a specific type of governance structure whose characteristics include paternalism, the 
state domineering over the individual, isolation from the outside world, and ambitions to be a great 
power. The heart of the system was the all-powerful leader, above the law and a law unto himself, 
concentrating in his hands all powers, without a balancing accountability, and limiting all other 
institutions to auxiliary, administrative functions. The Russian system did not need fixed rules of the 
game; it needed fixers’.21 The notion of fixers is reminiscent of the pushers in the planning system—
tolkachi and blatmeisters—whose purpose was to lubricate the rigid constraints of sistema, but also 
points to the theme of leadership, central to understanding informal governance.  
 
It is crucial, however, to see that sistema constrains the leader too. Power networks operate on 
principles similar to other informal networks and impose certain norms of reciprocity and informal 
constraints on people in official positions: first, blurred boundaries between friendship and the use of 
friendship; second, helping friends at the expense of public/corporate resources or access; and third, 
recruitment into networks according to a particular logic – it could be loyalty, dependence or 
compliance based on transgression/compromised recruiting—rather than the logic of competition 
and professionalism. 
 
The third characteristic of sistema is ambivalence. It is complex, anonymous, unpredictable and 
seemingly irrational. But at the same time, it serves to glue society together, to distribute resources 
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and to mobilize people; it contributes to both stability and change; and it ensures its own 
reproduction. Present-day sistema incites people to work, but does so in an ambivalent and even 
paradoxical way, its incentives prioritize short-term profit at the expense of long-term sustainability, 
loyalty at the expense of professionalism, safety and collective responsibility at the expense of 
leadership, innovative circumvention of sistema constraints at the expense of productive innovation. 
Self-made businessmen often comment on their success being achieved against the odds and despite 
the forces of sistema, whereas sistema businessmen prefer to avoid the subject of building close links 
with influential politicians or deny it.22  
 
Thus, Shevtsova acknowledges the capabilities of sistema, but she also speaks of the failure of 
success, the uncertainty of certainty, the instability of stability and the impotence of omnipotence as 
Russia’s systemic paradoxes. In her view, the economy functions in a dysfunctional way—the 
economic growth and stability of Putin’s Russia is detrimental to the country’s development in the 
long term.23 Given the dependence of sistema on informal capital flows, there is little wonder that 
administrative reforms in Russia have not been completed and that the principles of separation of 
powers and the rule of law are not fully operational.  
 
In academic terms, Putin’s sistema, with its virtual politics, rigged elections, ‘managed’ parliament, 
controlled parties and obedient television, leaves classical political science focused on political 
institutions somewhat helpless and unable to apply comparative methods. In political terms, dealing 
with Putin’s sistema for outsiders is just as difficult. In their Change or decay, Shevtsova and Wood 
discuss the prospects of Putin’s Russia. Both authors accept the liability the West holds with respect 
of Russia’s path and agree on the fact that Russia remains alien to the western political mentality. 
Harsh criticism is put on the insufficiency of western involvement in the Russian transition during 
the presidency of Yeltsin. Instead of encouraging institutional changes of the region when it had the 
influence to do so, the West has concentrated on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Shevtsova’s 
unforgiving condemnation of western policies is somewhat mitigated by Wood, who credits the 
West for stabilizing the region. He doubts the extent to which western involvement would be 
accepted by Russians, and similarly notes the ambivalence of the western political stance towards 
Russia. He argues that Russia is perceived as both foe and partner and the mutual engagement differs 
in different situations. Such reflections emphasise once again the ambivalence of sistema and the 
ambivalent nature of its responses to external pressures.  
 
It is tempting to assume that there are possible reform measures that could be undertaken to replace 
Putin’s sistema with a market economy and the rule of law (pravovoe obshchestvo). But the point 
about sistema is that it enables Russian society to cope with its problems while at the same time 
undermining that society. I argue that there is no obvious way of tackling sistema without weakening 
the various kinds of social cohesion that enable Russian society to function. 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Timchenko vs. the Economist, The Guardian, 30 July 2009, accessed at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/30/russian-billionaire-timchenko-libel-economist on 11 January 2012. 
23 Lilia Shevtsova’s lecture at Sciences Po, Paris, for the Shevtsova/Ledeneva course Can Russia 
Modernize? Elite Behaviour, Network Politics and Leadership Control, Autumn, 2010. 
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